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Recent Decisions
TORT LAW-NEW TRIAL-DAMAGES-PAIN AND SUFFERING-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a jury's failure to award
damages for pain and suffering in a personal injury action where
the evidence concerning the plaintiffs injuries is uncontested
and the injuries are of the type that common sense dictates
involve pain and suffering is shocking to a court's conscience and
therefore a new trial is appropriate.
Neison v. Hines, 653 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1995).
Louise Brand Neison ("Neison") filed a personal injury action
in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County,
Pennsylvania, against Laura B. Hines ("Hines") for damages
resulting from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on March
24, 1989.' Hines' pickup truck collided with the rear end of
Neison's vehicle as Neison was stopped, waiting to make a right
hand turn into a market.2 The collision forced Neison's head
backward, shattering the rear window of her two seat sports
car.? Following the accident, Neison was treated at the
emergency room of a hospital for a bruise on her head.4
Approximately two days after the accident, Neison returned to
the hospital, complaining of pain in her neck and shoulder
area.
5
1. Neison v. Hines, 653 A-2d 634, 636 (Pa. 1995).
2. Neison, 653 A.2d at 636. Neison was stopped, with her car's turn signal
flashing, while waiting to allow another vehicle into the intersection, when she was
struck by Hines' truck. Id.
3. Id. Testimony at trial showed that the force of the crash completely de-
stroyed the rear portion of Neison's vehicle, and Neison's eyeglasses were discovered
lying on the trunk of her vehicle. Id. at 637.
4. Id.
5. Id. Upon visiting the hospital a second time, the attending physician as-
sured Neison that this type of pain was not uncommon considering the nature of
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After one week of continuing neck and shoulder pain, Neison
visited the medical offices of Dr. John K. S. Lee ("Dr. Lee").6 Dr.
Lee diagnosed Neison's condition as a cervical sprain.7 In
addition to prescribing pain relievers and implementing a home
exercise program designed to strengthen the injured area, Dr.
Lee also imposed several lifting restrictions.8 A few months
later, Neison began visiting the offices of Dr. Andrew Lucas
("Dr. Lucas"), a chiropractor, who also determined that Neison
was suffering from a cervical strain.' During her treatments
with Dr. Lee and Dr. Lucas, Neison continued to be employed as
a physical education and health teacher, although she was
assigned supervisory duties.1"
Subsequently, Neison initiated a civil action against Hines in
the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County." During
the trial, Hines admitted being solely liable for causing the
accident of March 24, 1989.2 Because the issue of liability was
settled upon Hines' admission, the only issue remaining for the
jury to decide was the amount of damages, if any, Neison should
be awarded for pain and suffering as a result of the accident. 3
Both Dr. Lee and Dr. Lucas testified on Neison's behalf at
trial, asserting that Neison's neck and shoulder injuries were a
direct result of the accident." The defense presented the
testimony of Dr. William Mitchell ("Dr. Mitchell"), an orthopedic
surgeon, who conducted a medical examination of Neison
approximately two years after the accident. 5 According to Dr.
Mitchell, Neison showed evidence of having sustained a neck
and shoulder blade sprain, however, these injuries were healed
at the time that Dr. Mitchell conducted his examination. 6
her accident, and the doctor prescribed pain relievers and directed Neison to apply
moist heat to the affected area. Id. at 636.
6. Id. Dr. Lee is an orthopedic specialist. Id.
7. Neison, 653 A.2d at 636.
8. Id.
9. Id. Dr. Lucas treated Neison concurrently with Dr. Lee. Id.
10. Id. Although it was alleged that Neison's job was changed to a supervisory
position, Neison testified at trial that she was not absent from work for any amount
of time as a result of her injuries and she did not submit a claim for lost wages.
Brief for Appellee at 7, Neison (No. 905396).
11. Neison, 653 A.2d at 635.
12. Id. at 636.
13. Id. In order for the jury to find that Neison was entitled to an award for
her alleged injuries and pain' and suffering, the jury first had to believe that Hines'
negligence in causing the accident was a substantial factor in causing Neison's al-
leged injuries and pain and suffering. Brief for Appellee at 5, Neison (No. 905396).
14. Neison, 653 A.2d at 636.
15. Id.
16. Id. Dr. Mitchell stated that injuries of the type diagnosed typically heal in
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At the close of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for Hines,
thereby failing to award any damages to Neison for pain and
suffering. 7  Subsequently, Neison filed post-trial motions
requesting that she be granted a new trial, averring that the
jury's verdict was contrary to the instructions of the court and/or
contrary to the evidence that was presented at trial. 8 The trial
court granted Neison's request for a new trial and Hines
appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 9
On appeal, the superior court held that it is the task of the
jury to scrutinize the credibility of witnesses and to weigh and
assess the evidence adduced at trial." The court noted that it
was within the jury's discretion to believe or disbelieve the
evidence put forth at trial and, therefore, the jury could find
that Neison did not experience injuries or pain and suffering as
a result of the accident.2 The superior court held that the trial
court abused its discretion by substituting its judgment in the
place of the jury's, and accordingly reversed the trial court's
order granting Neison a new trial.2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur" to
determine whether the superior court's holding contradicted a
previous decision specifically dealing with the issue of whether
there are certain types of injuries that human experience
teaches are accompanied by pain. 4 Justice Montemuro, writing
for a unanimous court, determined that the issue before the
court was whether the trial court abused its discretion in
granting Neison's motion for a new trial on the basis that the
jury's failure to award Neison damages for pain and suffering
"shocked its conscience."" The court recognized that its
standard of review when scrutinizing an order granting a new
trial is limited to determining if the trial court abused its
about three to five months. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Neison, 653 A.2d at 636.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 636-37.
22. Id. at 636.
23. Id. Allocatur is defined as "a word . . .used to denote that a writ or
order was allowed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
24. Neison, 653 A.2d at 636. See Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 542 A.2d 516 (Pa.
1988). See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Boggavarapu.
25. Neison, 653 A.2d at 635. The court stated that a new trial was awarded
because the jury's failure to award damages was so contrary to the evidence pre-
sented at trial that it shocked the conscience of the court. ld. at 636. The court
opined that for the jury to choose not to believe the evidence adduced at trial defies
common sense and thus was shocking to the court. Id. at 638.
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discretion or committed an error of law.2" Furthermore, the
court noted that a trial court should not award a new trial
unless the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it
shocks the court's sense of justice.2 7
The court agreed with Hines' contention that a jury is free to
assess and weigh the merit of testimony placed into evidence,
and from this assessment the jury is free to believe or disbelieve
the testimony as it so determines.28 However, the court also
recognized that a jury may not issue a verdict that is conceived
through passion, prejudice, partiality or corruption.' The court
stated that the verdict must reflect some rational relationship to
the injuries and damages suffered by the plaintiff as set forth by
the uncontested evidence presented at trial."0 The court stated
that in essence, a jury may reject any and all evidence when
arriving at its verdict, unless the verdict conflicts with the
uncontested evidence presented at trial to such an extent as to
defy common sense and logic."'
The Neison court determined that the evidence presented at
trial undoubtedly confirmed that Neison had suffered head, neck
and shoulder injuries as a result of the vehicular accident that
was caused by Hines.3 2 The court noted that the uncontroverted
testimony of both Dr. Lee and Dr. Lucas clearly demonstrated
the extent of Neison's injuries. 3 The court further stated that
in addition to this evidence, Hines' expert witness, Dr. Mitchell,
testified at trial that his examination of Neison two years after
the accident revealed evidence of a healed neck sprain and a
healed scapular or shoulder blade sprain.' As a result of the
uncontroverted evidence offered at trial concerning Neison's
injuries, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in granting Neison a new trial. 5 The court
reasoned that the jury's disregard of the uncontroverted
evidence concerning Neison's injuries defied common sense and
26. Id. at 636.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 637.
29. Id.
30. Neison, 653 A.2d at 637.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 637-38.
33. Id. At trial, Dr. Lee testified that Neison suffered from post-traumatic
myofascitis pain syndrome in her neck and scapula, cervical sprain syndrome and a
herniated disk. Id. at 637. Also, Dr. Lucas testified that his diagnosis of Neison re-
vealed fibromyalgia (inflammation of the muscle tissue) and a cervical strain. Id.
34. Id. at 637.
35. Neison, 653 A.2d at 638.
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was therefore shocking to the court's sense of justice."
The court also determined that the decision of the trial court
coincided with existing case law pertaining to the issue of
compensable pain. 7 The court relied on a general principle of
Pennsylvania tort law which states that a person should be
compensated for any pain or damage suffered due to the tort of
another."8 The court recognized that pain may be considered
subjective and therefore may be compensable if the jury believes
that the pain is present.3" However, when dealing with
subjective pain, the court stated that the jury is not bound to
believe or find that every injury involves or is associated with
pain.' Nonetheless, the court held that the injuries sustained
by Neison were obvious injuries of the type that one would
naturally associate with some degree of pain and suffering. 1
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the trial court
that the majority of the evidence presented undoubtedly showed
that Neison had received neck and shoulder injuries as a result
of the accident and that these obvious injuries were not
vigorously opposed or controverted at trial.42 Therefore, because
the uncontroverted evidence suggested that Neison suffered from
obvious injuries as a result of the accident, the court concluded
that the jury was not free to disregard this evidence when it
arrived at its verdict. 3
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion and was warranted in
granting Neison a new trial." The court reasoned that the
failure of the jury to consider the uncontradicted evidence
presented at trial, as well as the evidence of Neison's obvious
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 542 A.2d 516 (Pa. 1988)).
39. Id. (citing Boggavarapu).
40. Neison, 653 A.2d at 638. The court reasoned that a jury should always
consider evidence of subjective pain, however, it is never constrained to believe that
the alleged pain is always present. Id.
41. Id. In Boggavarapu, the court determined that obvious injuries that one
would naturally associate with some degree of pain and suffering include: -The bro-
ken bone, the stretched muscle, twist of the skeletal system, injury to a nerve, or-
gan or other function, and all the consequences of any injury traceable among medi-
cal science and common experience as sources of pain and suffering." Boggavarapu,
542 A.2d at 518.
42. Neison, 653 A.2d at 639. Both Dr. Lee and Dr. Lucas testified as to the
neck and shoulder injuries suffered by Neison. Id. at 637. Furthermore, Hines' med-
ical expert, Dr. Mitchell, testified that he discovered evidence of a healed neck and
shoulder sprain when he examined Neison. Id.
43. Id. at 637.
44. Id. at 640.
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injuries, did indeed shock the court's conscience.4' The court
reversed the superior court's order and reinstated the trial
court's order granting Neison a new trial."6
Pennsylvania courts have addressed the adequacy of jury
verdicts for over two hundred years. In Roberts v. Swift,' the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard an appeal from a trial court
order denying the defendant a new trial in an action of
assumpsit.5 The defendant argued that the jury verdict for the
plaintiff in the amount of 720 pounds was excessive and that the
jury should have awarded the lesser amount of 450 pounds.49
The court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff and reasoned
that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence.5" The
court concluded that "the damages are liberal, but not so
outrageous as to justify the interposition of the Court in
ordering a new trial.""1
In 1891, in the case of Bradwell v. Pittsburgh & W.E.R. Co.,"
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a trial court decision
in which the adequacy of the jury verdict was in question.53
Finding the jury verdict of 6 1/4 cents to be a travesty of justice,
the court noted the uncontroverted testimony as to the plaintiffs
injuries, the medical charges incurred, and the plaintiffs loss of
wages.5 The court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to
the jury's proper consideration of his damages and ordered a
45. Id.
46. Id. The court remanded the case to the Washington County Court of Com-
mon Pleas for further proceedings consistent with the court's holding. Id.
47. 1 Yeates 209 (Pa. 1793).
48. Roberts, 1 Yeates at 209. Assumpsit is defined as "a common law form of
action which lies for the recovery of damages for the non-performance of a parol or
simple contract, or a contract that is neither of record nor under seal." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 122 (6th ed. 1990).
49. Roberts, 1 Yeates at 211. The plaintiff sought compensation for household
services provided by her as promised by the defendant. Id. at 209. Testimony was
given as to the harsh treatment of the woman by the defendant and the number of
years she was in the employ of the defendant. Id. at 211-12.
50. Id. at 212. The court reasoned that the jury may have been properly influ-
enced by the harsh treatment of the woman and the refusal of the defendant to
compensate the woman for the household services she provided. Id.
51. Id.
52. 20 A. 1046 (Pa. 1891).
53. Bradwell, 20 A. at 1047.
54. Id. The plaintiff was injured when his horse-drawn cart came into contact
with a loose rail owned by the defendant streetcar company. Id. at 1046. The plain-
tiff broke his leg in two places and as a result was permanently disabled. Id. On
the plaintiffs motion for a new trial, the trial court entered an order for the defen-
dant to tender $400 to the plaintiff within one month or upon the defendant's fail-
ure to do so, a new trial would be ordered. Id. The defendant tendered the money
to the plaintiff within thirty days, but the plaintiff refused to accept it. Id. The trial
court then entered judgement on the verdict and the plaintiff appealed. Id.
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new trial."
In Dougherty v. Andrews, 6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that a trial court judge's decision to set aside a verdict and
grant a new trial should not be disturbed if the trial court judge
did not commit an abuse of discretion in making the
determination.57 The plaintiff, while acting in his capacity as
administrator of an estate, brought an action for trover" and
conversion 9 against the defendant in an attempt to recover a
bank note that was owned by the decedent."° At trial, both the
plaintiff and the defendant claimed that they were entitled to
the note and both presented evidence and testimony in an
attempt to support their respective positions."' After the jury
entered a verdict for the defendant, the trial judge entered an
order granting the plaintiff a new trial. 2 The issue presented
to the court on appeal was whether the trial judge abused his
discretion when he granted the plaintiff a new trial after
determining that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the
evidence adduced at trial.6 " The court reasoned that the
testimony of the plaintiffs witnesses coupled with the fact that
the decedent continued to collect interest on the note after the
defendant claimed the gift was made to her overwhelmingly
supported the plaintiffs case.' The court, upon examining the
evidence and the judge's instructions to the jury, held that the
trial judge had not committed an abuse of discretion and was
therefore warranted in entering an order granting a new trial.65
55. Id. at 1047.
56. 52 A. 47 (Pa. 1902).
57. Dougherty, 52 A. at 51.
58. Id. at 47. Trover is defined as a "common-law form of action to recover
value of goods or chattels by reason of an alleged unlawful interference with posses-
sory right of another, by assertion or exercise of possession or dominion over the
chattels, which is adverse and hostile to rightful possessor." BLACK'S LAW DICTIO-
NARY 1508 (6th ed. 1990).
59. Dougherty, 52 A. at 47. Conversion is defined as "any unauthorized act
which deprives an owner of his property permanently or for an indefinite time."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (6th ed. 1990).
60. Dougherty, 52 A. at 47. The plaintiff claimed that the note was the lawful
property of the estate because the decedent had merely left the note with the defen-
dant until he was ready to call for it and the defendant had retained the money
since the decedent's death without any authority or right to do so. Id. The defendant
claimed that the decedent had made a gift of the note to her and therefore the note
and the money that it represented was lawfully hers. Id. at 50.
61. Id. at 49.
62. Id. at 51.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 50.
65. Dougherty, 52 A. at 51. The court noted that the plaintiff presented testi-
mony that the decedent had given the note to the defendant until he was ready to
1996
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In Maloy v. Rosenbaum Co.,8 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decided that it is the duty of the trial judge to ensure that
a verdict is not allowed to stand if it is against the weight of the
evidence or shocking to the judicial conscience of the court."1 In
Maloy, the defendant's employee negligently drove a delivery
vehicle into the plaintiff, who was a pedestrian."8 At trial, the
defendant argued that the evidence established that the
employee was not acting within the scope of his employment at
the time of the accident, and the evidence was so clear and
uncontroverted as to allow the trial court, rather than the jury,
to determine the issue of liability as a matter of law.69
The Maloy court was faced with the issue of whether the
evidence presented at trial was so uncontroverted as to require
the trial court to determine the matter at hand, rather than
have the jury consider the evidence and arrive at a verdict.7"
The court held that it was proper for the trial court to allow the
jury to consider the evidence adduced at trial, because both
parties had presented evidence directed at the issue of whether
the driver was an employee acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident.71 The court recognized
that it is the task of the jury to weigh the evidence and to
deduce inferences and conclusions from the available
evidence.7" Consequently, the court determined that every trial
judge is faced with the task of ensuring that a jury does not
usurp the trial judge's power and issue a verdict that is against
the weight of the evidence or that shocks the court's judicial
call for it and that the decedent continued to collect the interest from the note dur-
ing his lifetime. Id. at 50. The court, however, failed to specifically state the exact
reasons the trial judge gave for granting the plaintiffs request for a new trial, mere-
ly stating that for reasons assigned the verdict was set aside. Id. at 51.
66. 103 A. 882 (Pa. 1918).
67. Maloy, 103 A. at 883.
68. Id. The plaintiff was walking on a street in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania when
the defendant's delivery vehicle struck and injured him. Id.
69. Id. At trial, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant was liable for his
injuries because the defendant's employee was driving negligently and was acting in
the scope of his employment at the time the accident occurred. Id. at 882. Converse-
ly, the defendant contended that his employee was "joy riding" and thus was not
acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. Id. at 883.
70. id. at 883.
71. Id. Although the defendant claimed that the employee was not returning
to the garage via the most direct route and had picked up a passenger in violation
of company policy, the plaintiff testified that the employee had been delivering pack-
ages for the defendant earlier in the evening, the car had the defendant's company
name painted on the door and the car was being operated in an area where the
defendant regularly did business. Id.
72. Maloy, 103 A. at 883.
730 Vol. 34:723
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conscience." The court further stated that a trial judge may
order as many new trials as it takes to ensure that this
standard is upheld.7 After reviewing the record, the Maloy
court held that the evidence was properly considered by the jury
and the trial judge did not commit error by refusing to grant a
new trial.7"
In Schwartz v. Jaffe," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
continued to uphold the authority of trial courts to set aside
inadequate or excessive jury verdicts.77 Upon review, the court
agreed that a $3000 jury verdict returned in favor of the
plaintiff was inadequate in light of the injuries sustained." The
court stated that a trial court may set aside a jury verdict if it is
patently insufficient." The court held that damages, loss of an
eye and the inability to continue in a profession are substantial
and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the plaintiff's motion for a new trial.8"
In the 1940's, the authority of Pennsylvania trial courts to
amend inadequate or excessive jury verdicts continued to be
recognized.8' In the next decade, the state's highest court
continued the process of defining that authority. In Takac v.
Barnford,2 an appeal was taken after the plaintiffs motion for
a new trial, based on inadequacy of the jury verdict, was
denied. 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that based on
the record, the verdict of $3000 in favor of the plaintiff was




76. 188 A. 295 (Pa. 1936).
77. Schwartz, 188 A. at 296.
78. Id. The plaintiff, a passenger in a car being driven by the defendant,
brought suit after she sustained serious injuries, including the loss of vision in her
right eye, following a one-car accident caused by the defendant's negligent driving.
Id. The plaintiff also received facial injuries which left her permanently disfigured.
Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The plaintiff had to take another job which paid forty percent less be-
cause she was no longer able to maintain her job as a bookkeeper due to her vision
loss. Id. The jury awarded the plaintiff $460 for her medical costs, $500 for loss of
wages for five months, and $2040 for the loss of her eye, disfigurement, suffering
and future expenses. Id. The supreme court noted that an appellate court will not
disrupt the decision of a trial court unless a gross abuse of discretion occurs. Id.
81. See Coleman v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 43 A.2d 540, 542 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1945) (holding that the power to grant a new trial because of the inadequacy or ex-
cessiveness of the damages allowed by a jury is undisputed) (citing Palmer v. Leader
Publishing Co., 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 594, 598 (1898)).
82. 88 A.2d 86 (Pa. 1952).
83. Takac, 88 A.2d at 87.
84. Id. at 89. The plaintiff was injured when a bus on which he was riding
1996
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The court reasoned that there were many inconsistencies in the
plaintiffs testimony which the jury could have properly
considered when awarding damages. 5 The court concluded that
the jury was responsible for weighing the evidence and awarding
damages as it saw fit."6 Adducing the amount to be reasonable,
the court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
denying the plaintiffs motion for a new trial. 7
In Todd v. Bercini,ss the supreme court affirmed a trial
court's decision granting the plaintiffs motion for a new trial."9
Reasoning that a jury may not overlook injuries commonly
known to be painful, the court held that no abuse of discretion
would be found upon a trial court granting a new trial when
justice dictates." The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
for the precise amount of her medical bills and failed to award
her any money for pain and suffering, inconvenience, lost wages
or loss of future earning capacity.91 After the plaintiff was
granted a new trial for inadequacy of the verdict, the defendant
appealed.92 The Todd court held that a jury may not ignore the
existence of pain when a parties' injuries are of the type that
common sense and experience indicate that pain and discomfort
are present.93 The Todd court concluded that the jury clearly
failed to compensate the plaintiff for the whole of her injuries
suffered as a result of the defendant's negligence and therefore
the grant of a new trial was not an abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court.94
In Elza v. Chovan,s5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
experienced brake failure, causing the driver to lose control and crash. Id. at 87.
85. Id. at 88. The physical nature of the plaintiffs work responsibilities before
the accident and his extended 21-month leave from work following the accident were
both contradicted. Id. The plaintiffs own medical witness testified that his injuries
had healed within 90 days. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 89. The court noted: "The grant or refusal of a new trial for inade-
quacy of the verdict is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial court whose
action will not be reversed on appeal except for a clear abuse of discretion .
Id.
88. 92 A.2d 538 (Pa. 1952).
89. Todd, 92 A.2d at 539.
90. Id. The plaintiff, a passenger in the defendant's car, was hospitalized three
times for her injuries, underwent surgery twice, and sustained permanent disabilities
as a result of the defendant's automobile hitting a steel utility pole. Id. at 538. The
jury returned a verdict of $2070.43 for the plaintiff, representing the sum of her
medical expenses alone. Id.
91. Id. at 538.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 539.
94. Todd, 92 A.2d at 539.
95. 152 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1959).
Vol. 34:723
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asked to decide if a trial court abused its discretion by granting
a new trial on the basis of an inadequate jury verdict.96 The
court held that the verdict was not inadequate and that the trial
court had committed a gross abuse of discretion.97 Pointing to
several inconsistencies in the testimony of the plaintiff, the
supreme court concluded that the jury simply did not believe
him and awarded an amount less than his alleged medical
expenses as a compromise verdict.9 " The court cautioned that in
order to sustain a grant of a new trial, trial courts must
demonstrate in a written opinion the urgency of the injustice of
the jury verdict.9
In 1961, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the case of
Thompson v. Iannuzzi.00 The Thompson court held that a new
trial was required because the plaintiff introduced evidence that
she experienced severe injuries and numerous medical bills, but
the jury failed to grant her any damages for pain and
suffering.'0 ' The plaintiff was injured when the defendant
collided with the rear end of a vehicle in which the plaintiff was
riding as a passenger."2 The plaintiff suffered severe neck and
back injuries as a result of the accident. 3 In addition, the
plaintiff experienced persistent headaches after the accident and
was required to have her coccyx removed due to a severe
fracture.'" At trial, the jury determined that the defendant
was negligent in the operation of his automobile and therefore
awarded the plaintiffs husband money to pay for his wife's
medical bills." 5 However, the jury failed to award the plaintiff
any damages for the pain and suffering associated with her
96. Elza, 152 A.2d at 239.
97. Id. at 241. As the majority reasoned, "[tihere should be nothing difficult
about a decision to grant a new trial for inadequacy: the injustice of the verdict
should stand forth like a beacon." Id. In granting the new trial, the trial court judge
had described the decision as difficult and akin to tossing a coin. Id. at 239.
98. Id. at 241. The plaintiff, a passenger on a motorcycle, sustained injuries
upon being thrown from the motorcycle when it collided with a car operated by the
defendant. Id. at 241-42. The plaintiff was hospitalized for a week and did not re-
turn to work for approximately three months. Id. at 242.
99. Id. at 241.
100. 169 A.2d 777 (Pa. 1961).
101. Thompson, 169 A.2d at 779.
102. Id. at 777.
103. Id. at 778. The plaintiff received her injuries when she was thrown to the
floor and against a metal portion of the driver's seat. Id. at 777.
104. Id. at 778. The coccyx is a small bone, consisting of usually four vertebrae
which forms the lower extremity of the vertebral or spinal column. DORLAND'S ILLUS-
TRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 352 (27th ed. 1988).
105. Thompson, 169 A.2d at 778. The jury granted an award of $758.00 for the
medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff. Id.
1996
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injuries." The issue facing the court was whether a new trial
was proper because the evidence concerning the plaintiffs
injuries and pain was entirely inconsistent with the jury's
verdict, which failed to award any damages for pain and
suffering."7 The court reasoned that it is unconscionable for a
jury to award money to a husband to pay his wife's medical bills,
but not to award any damages for pain and suffering to the wife
for the same injuries."0 The Thompson court determined that
the plaintiff would have been subjected to some pain and
suffering considering the severity and type of injuries that she
sustained."° In concluding that a new trial was proper, the
court opined that the jury clearly disregarded the evidence
concerning the plaintiffs injuries and pain and suffering and
thereby entered a verdict that was inconsistent with the
evidence. 11
In Boggavarapu v. Ponist," the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court again demonstrated its commitment to provide deferential
guidance to trial courts. Reversing a new trial order, the court
held that there are certain injuries for which a jury may not
disregard pain and suffering damages."2 The court reasoned
that a jury may find a dog bite or a tetanus shot to be a mere
inconvenience of life and the jury was free to award only
minimal damages.' Stating that a jury is not compelled to
106. Id. The plaintiff testified that she suffered severe headaches and pain in
her neck, spine and back areas after the accident. Id. Furthermore, the plaintiffs
doctor testified that her injuries were a direct result of the accident. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. Both the plaintiff and her doctor offered testimony on the severity and
seriousness of her injuries. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that it was a matter of
common sense that injuries of this type are associated with some pain and suffering.
Id.
110. Thompson, 169 A.2d at 779. The court stated that the pain and suffering
associated with this type of injury was so obvious that it defies common sense to
disallow damages for pain and suffering. Id. at 778-79.
111. 542 A.2d 516 (Pa. 1988).
112. Boggavarapu, 542 A.2d at 518. In Boggavarapu, the plaintiff was bitten by
the defendant's dog. Id. at 517. The plaintiff sustained two puncture wounds and
was taken to a hospital emergency room where he received a bandage and two teta-
nus shots. Id. Alleging that the shots injured his sciatic nerve, the plaintiff brought
suit against the defendant for various damages and the defendant joined the hos-
pital and the attending physician in the suit. Id. The plaintiff sought $9,000 in
medical costs and pain and suffering damages. Id. Finding neither the hospital nor
the physician liable, the jury returned a verdict of only $42.60 for the plaintiff, the
amount of his emergency room treatment alone. Id. at 518.
113. Id. at 518. The allegation that the needle pierced the plaintiffs sciatic
nerve was strenuously argued at the trial. Id. Medical testimony was given to the
fact that such an injury was not possible from a tetanus shot puncture. Id. After
the piercing injury was disproved, the jury was left with the question of subjective
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award pain damages when no identifiable injury has been
proven, the court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict.""
The principles set forth in Boggavarapu have been frequently
applied by Pennsylvania appellate courts."'
In Kiser v. Schulte,"' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
again demonstrated the authority of appellate courts to review
and reverse inadequate jury verdicts."7 The court held that a
jury award of $25,000 was clearly inadequate and "shocking" in
light of the uncontroverted evidence as to damages and
remanded the case for a new trial on damages only."'
Reasoning that the only testimony presented on the issue of
damages was uncontroverted, the court found the amount
awarded to be unsupported by the evidence presented."9
Finding that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting
a new trial, the court affirmed the order of the superior court
vacating the jury award and remanded for a new trial on the
issue of damages."'
The Neison court appears to have adopted a common sense
pain. Id. at 518-19.
114. Id. at 519. The court stated: "We do not mean to imply that there are
magic, invocatory words that of themselves will justify a new trial." Id. However, the
court held that the trial judge's statement that he would have denied a new trial if
pain and suffering damages were awarded "no matter how small," was not sufficient
proof that an injustice had occurred by the award of no pain and suffering damages.
Id. Finding no injustice in the verdict and not convinced by the trial court's ratio-
nale, the court held that the order for a new trial could not stand. Id.
115. See Nudelman v. Gilbride, 647 A.2d 233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (affirming
the denial of a new trial motion after the jury returned a substantial verdict);
Lupkin v. Sternick, 636 A.2d 661 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (affirming a new trial order
after no damages were awarded to the plaintiff for "soft tissue injuries" she received
in a rear-end accident in which the defendant conceded liability and his medical
witness corroborated the plaintiff's injuries); Hawley v. Donahoo, 611 A.2d 311 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that a fracture of a vertebra is an objective injury to
which pain and suffering damages must attach).
116. 648 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1994).
117. Kiser, 648 A.2d at 4. The plaintiffs' daughter, age 18, was killed when a
car in which she was riding crashed shortly after she, the defendant driver, and his
girlfriend left a wedding reception where all three had been drinking heavily. Id. at
3. The parents of the decedent brought separate wrongful death and survival actions
against both the defendant and the hosts of the reception. Id.
118. Id. at 4. The jury found the defendant 60% liable and the hosts of the
reception 40% liable. Id. at 3. The jury also found the decedent negligent, but it did
not find the decedent's negligence to be a substantial factor in causing her death.
Id.
119. Id. at 4. The sole witness on the issue of damages testified that the loss
of the plaintiff to her family was between $11,862.50 and $18,980.00. Id. at 5. The
loss to the decedent's estate in the survival action was estimated between
$232,400.00 and $756,081.43. Id. In addition, funeral expenses totaled $8,411.00. Id.
at 5 n.2.
120. Id. at 8.
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approach when it determined that the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion in granting Neison a new trial. The court
concluded that the evidence adduced at trial was of the type that
would normally lead a reasonable person to believe that some
degree of pain and suffering was present from the types of
injuries that Neison experienced.12' The court, largely relying
on its holding in Boggavarapu, determined that Neison's injuries
were objective in nature and thus ordinarily would be associated
with some degree of pain and suffering. 22 The court also
recognized that the existence of Neison's injuries was not
vigorously contested by the defendant's medical expert, who
admitted that Neison had suffered from a neck and shoulder
blade sprain.'23 Furthermore, the type of injuries suffered by
Neison and the violent manner in which they were incurred
differed markedly from the subjective types of injuries such as
those caused by a dog bite or the piercing of a needle as in
Boggavarapu."'
The Neison decision suggests that when liability is not an
issue in a personal injury case and there is uncontradicted
evidence concerning a plaintiffs injuries, a jury should consider
whether the injuries are of the type that common sense suggests
involve pain and discomfort. If common sense suggests that the
injury is of the type that would cause pain, then the plaintiff is
entitled to an award for pain and suffering. However, this
rationale is only proper when the evidence and medical
testimony concerning the plaintiffs injuries is uncontradicted,
because it is possible to vigorously contest whether an injury
actually exists, thus reducing the injury from an objective type
injury to a subjective type injury. According to the court's
rationale in Neison, a trial court will not be faulted for granting
121. Neison, 653 A.2d at 638.
122. Id. at 638-39. Neison's herniated disk and neck and shoulder blade sprain
are injuries of the type that conform with the court's definition of an "objective in-
jury" as set forth in Boggavarapu. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Boggavarapu.
123. Neison, 653 A.2d at 639. Had the defendant vehemently contested the exis-
tence of Neison's injuries or introduced substantial evidence that the injuries were
caused by some occurrence other than the accident in question, the court may have
been inclined to accept the jury's failure to award damages for pain and suffering.
Id. However, the court did recognize that the defendant's doctor disputed the degree
and extent of Neison's shoulder and neck injuries. Id.
124. Id. at 638. Common sense dictates that a herniated disk, a sprained neck
and a sprained shoulder received as a result of a violent car accident are of a more
serious and substantial nature than the small puncture wounds that are normally
caused by a dog bite or the piercing of a needle. These former injuries are of the




a new trial based upon a jury's failure to award damages for
pain and suffering when the injuries complained of are shown to
be caused by the tort of another, are objective in nature and
their existence is uncontradicted.
The court was correct in holding that there are certain types
of injuries that commonly and naturally involve some degree of
pain and suffering. It is irrational to assume that a person who
is involved in a violent automobile accident will not experience
some amount of pain and suffering from injuries. Although
Neison was not forced to miss any work following her
accident,"= it is still logical to assume that Neison endured
some degree of pain and discomfort from her injuries which she
was not subjected to before the accident. Although the supreme
court has left open to the jury the option to issue a smaller
award to a plaintiff when the jury believes that the plaintiffs
injuries have not caused significant detriment to the plaintiff,
the court has also dictated that it will not allow a jury to issue a
verdict that completely eliminates damages for pain and
suffering when there are objective-type injuries involved.
The Neison court has preserved the general theory of tort law
that victims of torts of others must be compensated for their
losses. Furthermore, when a plaintiff proves that they have
suffered from objective-type injuries, the court will not allow a
jury to withhold compensation from the plaintiff for the pain and
suffering that is commonly associated with the plaintiffs
injuries. Given the Neison court's holding, a trial court judge
may properly grant a new trial when it appears that a jury has
failed to award damages for pain and suffering when a plaintiff
has suffered objective-type injuries that are naturally associated
with some degree of pain.
The Neison holding appears to provide a mutually beneficial
rule for plaintiffs and defendants alike. It serves to compensate
plaintiffs in some amount, as determined by the triers of fact,
for the torts caused by defendants, but exonerates defendants
from this duty if the jury does not reasonably believe that either
the injury or the pain exists. While preserving the traditional
province of the jury, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
demonstrated its continuing authority and responsibility to
insure the proper application of the law.
Scott P. Bittner
Joyce A. Hatfield-Wise
125. Brief for Appellee at 7, Neison (No. 90-5396). As a result of her continued
employment after the accident, Neison did not present a claim for lost wages. Id.
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